Rescuing Retrogression by Pitts, Michael J.
Florida State University Law Review




Indiana University MicKinney School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Election Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Pitts, Rescuing Retrogression, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 741 (2017) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol43/iss2/11
RESCUING RETROGRESSION 
MICHAEL J. PITTS 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  741 
 II. SECTION 5: WHAT HAS BEEN LOST ...................................................................  742 
 III. RESCUING RETROGRESSION ..............................................................................  749 
 A. The Presumption of a Section 2 Violation .................................................  749 
 B. Why Rescue Retrogression? ........................................................................  753 
 C. Concerns About Rescuing Retrogression ....................................................  758 
 IV. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  761 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The Voting Rights Act1 ain’t what it used to be. After a nearly 
half-century run of success, the Supreme Court used Shelby County 
v. Holder2 to put one of the most seminal provisions of the Act, sec-
tion 5, into what amounts to a permanent exile. While technically 
Shelby County did not slay section 5—it only interred the coverage 
formula from section 4 of the Act that makes section 5 operative—it 
seems unlikely section 5 will ever be functional again.3 
 Section 5’s demise is a shame. Section 5 prevented certain state or 
local governments (the so-called “covered jurisdictions”) from imple-
menting changes to voting laws, such as redistricting plans or the 
movement of polling places, that discriminated against racial and 
language minorities (i.e., “minority voters”).4 Section 5 accomplished 
this important task through a process known as “preclearance” where 
the covered jurisdictions would have to garner approval from the fed-
eral government—either the United States Attorney General or a 
federal court in Washington, D.C.—prior to implementing any voting 
change.5 Over the years, this preclearance process prevented the im-
plementation of voting changes adopted with a discriminatory pur-
pose or, most importantly for purposes of this Article, which would 
have a retrogressive effect on minority voters.6 As a result, minority 
                                                                                                                                 
  © 2016. Professor of Law and Dean’s Fellow, Indiana University Robert H. 
McKinney School of Law. Thanks to Susan DeMaine for library assistance, Jessica Dickin-
son for research assistance, and Bob Berman for helpful comments. Thanks also to Franita 
Tolson and the editors of the Florida State University Law Review for organizing an excel-
lent conference on the law of democracy and to the participants in the conference, especial-
ly Michael Morley, for comments. 
 1. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10702 (Supp. II 2014). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 2631 (declaring section 4(b) unconstitutional and “issu[ing] no holding on § 5 
itself”). 
 4. FOLEY, PITTS & DOUGLAS, ELECTION LAW AND LITIGATION: THE JUDICIAL 
REGULATION OF POLITICS 97-98 (2014). 
 5. Id. at 99-100. 
 6. Id. at 100-01. 
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voters were able to make and retain significant gains in both the  
ability to cast a countable ballot and the ability to elect preferred 
candidates of their choice.7 
 The demise of section 5 means section 2 of the Voting Rights Act8 
now stands as the main bulwark against voting discrimination. Sec-
tion 2—for reasons that will be described more fully in this Article—
does not provide the same level of protection as section 5. Section 2, 
through affirmative litigation brought by minority plaintiffs,  
prevents the use of electoral laws that under the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” have discriminatory “results.”9 This “results” standard 
provides less protection for minority voters than section 5’s retrogres-
sion test. 
 The thesis of this Article is a simple one—that the section 5 retro-
gression test should be “rescued” by importing it into the section 2 
results framework. More specifically, proof that a newly adopted  
voting law will retrogress minority voting strength should create a 
strong presumption that the newly adopted voting law violates the 
section 2 results test. Part II of this Article will explicate more fully 
what the demise of section 5 has wrought and why the retrogression 
test is one of the most important things that has disappeared. Part 
III of this Article will provide details on how the retrogression test 
could be imported into section 2 and defends that importation from a 
doctrinal and theoretical perspective. 
II.   SECTION 5: WHAT HAS BEEN LOST 
 To fully comprehend why the section 5 retrogression standard 
should be imported into the section 2 results test, one needs to  
understand several things. First, one needs to appreciate how section 
5’s retrogression standard operated as a protection for minority  
voters. Second, one needs to know what section 2’s results test cur-
rently protects. Finally, one needs to grasp the nature of the loss of 
                                                                                                                                 
 7. See Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
1575, 1582-88 (2010) (describing how enforcement of section 5 both retained existing  
gains for minority voters and compelled the creation of additional opportunities to elect 
candidates of choice); see also Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of 
Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 923 (2008) [hereinafter Pitts, Maintenance] (“Section 5, 
however, served as more than a shield to prevent backsliding; it was also wielded by the 
federal government as a sword to affirmatively compel the creation of additional ‘safe’ sin-
gle-member districts, which inexorably led to an increase in descriptive representation.”). 
 8. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. II 2014). 
 9. Id. While the Supreme Court has not definitively so held, it would appear that 
section 2 also prevents the use of electoral laws that are purposefully discriminatory.  
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a section 2 
violation can be proved by showing discriminatory purpose). 
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protection for minority voters that resulted from Shelby County—or 
what the University of Chicago’s Nicholas Stephanopoulos refers to 
as “the gap between Section 2 and Section 5.”10 
 Section 5 had two unique aspects—one procedural, the other sub-
stantive. The unique procedural aspect was the idea of preclearance. 
In essence, covered jurisdictions were permanently enjoined from 
making changes to their election laws.11 In other words, section 5 
froze the electoral laws in the covered jurisdictions, and a voting 
change could only be implemented in a covered jurisdiction if approv-
al (i.e., preclearance) was obtained from a federal entity in Washing-
ton, D.C.—either the United States Attorney General through an 
administrative process or the D.C. District Court through litigation.12 
In each instance, the federal government could not approve the vot-
ing change until determining the covered jurisdiction had met its 
burden of proving the change did not discriminate against minority 
voters in purpose or effect.13 
 On the other hand, section 2, the primary remaining protection for 
minority voters, relies on the normal litigation process. Instead of 
voting laws being frozen until federal approval, a jurisdiction can 
immediately adopt and implement a voting change.14 The change will 
remain in place until a plaintiff brings an affirmative lawsuit and 
either proves that preliminary injunctive relief should issue or wins 
the case on the merits, both of which involve some demonstration 
that the voting change produces discriminatory results against  
minority voters.15 
 In my view, losing the actual process of section 5 preclearance  
is the biggest harm to minority voters emanating from the Shelby 
County decision for two reasons. First, a huge deterrent to the adop-
tion of discriminatory voting changes has been eliminated. The cov-
ered jurisdictions knew that to implement any voting change they 
had to secure federal approval and that federal approval would focus 
solely on the presence or absence of discrimination against minority 
voters. This knowledge led to the covered jurisdictions not adopting 
potentially discriminatory changes at all.16 Second, the section 5 pro-
                                                                                                                                 
 10. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 
55, 57 (2013). 
 11. Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy? 
81 DENVER U. L. REV. 225, 232-34 (2003). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 235. 
 14. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. II 2014). 
 15. Preliminary injunctive relief would involve demonstrating a likelihood of success 
on the merits. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (providing 
standard for preliminary injunctive relief). 
 16. Pitts, supra note 11, at 259 (describing deterrence factor); Tomas Lopez, Shelby 
County: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2 (2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
744  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:741 
 
 
cess ensured that every single electoral change in the covered juris-
dictions received some kind of review—what we might describe in 
Harry Potter terms as “constant vigilance.”17 There was no opportuni-
ty for a voting change to slip through the cracks and be implemented 
in a covered jurisdiction without having some level of review by the 
federal government to ensure the absence of discrimination.18 
 One does not have to look very far following the Shelby County 
decision to see how section 5 deterred the adoption of discriminatory 
changes.19 In April 2013, prior to the Shelby County ruling, the North 
Carolina House passed a photo identification bill.20 That bill sat idle, 
though, in the North Carolina Senate Rules Committee, quite likely 
because North Carolina Senators thought the bill would not pass 
muster under section 5.21 But then Shelby County was handed down 
in June and the Senate Rules Committee Chair said, “So, now we can 
go with the full bill.”22 The “full bill” ultimately adopted by North 
                                                                                                                                 
sites/default/files/analysis/Shelby_County_One_Year_Later.pdf (noting “hundreds of voting 
changes that were deterred because jurisdictions knew they would not withstand [Section 
5] VRA review”); see also Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 
1042, 1055 (D. Ariz. 2014) (“[Several factors] may work together to tilt the board somewhat 
because they encourage a state that wants to obtain preclearance to overshoot the mark, 
particularly if it wants its first submission [to the Justice Department] to be approved. 
Because it is not clear where the Justice Department will draw the line, there is a natural 
incentive to provide a margin of error or to aim higher than might actually be necessary.”). 
 17. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 217 (2000). 
 18. Admittedly, this is from a theoretical perspective. It was always possible for a 
jurisdiction not to comply with section 5 preclearance by failing to submit a voting change 
for federal approval. However, such a failure was easily cured because a plaintiff could 
bring what was known as a section 5 enforcement action. See Pitts, supra note 11, at 236 
(describing section 5 enforcement actions). Such an enforcement action was easy to win on 
the merits because all that needed proving was that a voting change had occurred and that 
preclearance for the change had not been obtained. See id. 
 19. See Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-Supreme-Court-ruling-
states-rush-to-enact-voting-laws.html; see also Theresa Anne Bodwin, Rocking the Vote: 
How Preclearance Became Powerless and the Way to Bring the Power Back, 1 INDON. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 502, 528-32 (2014) (describing adoption of potentially discriminatory 
changes after Shelby County); Lopez, supra note 16, at 2-4 (also describing states’ adoption 
of potentially discriminatory changes after Shelby County). 
 20. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 230 (4th  
Cir. 2014). 
 21. Id. at 231 (noting that the Senate Rules Committee took no action on the proposal 
and implying that the lack of action related to the need to submit the proposal for preclear-
ance); see also id. at 229 (“On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court lifted certain Voting 
Rights Act restrictions that had long prevented jurisdictions like North Carolina from pass-
ing laws that would deny minorities equal access. The very next day, North Carolina began 
pursuing sweeping voting reform . . . .”) (citation omitted). Indeed, one federal court had 
already used section 5 to bar Texas’ photo identification requirement and another federal 
court had, in essence, rewritten South Carolina’s photo identification requirement to pre-
vent retrogression. See generally Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2012); South 
Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 22. League of Women Voters, 769 F.3d at 231. 
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Carolina included several changes that likely would have violated 
section 5 and are currently being challenged using section 2.23 But 
the “full bill” probably would never have been adopted absent Shelby 
County.24 
 There is also good reason to think discriminatory changes will go 
unchallenged prior to implementation, particularly at the local level. 
High-profile changes, such as those that occurred in North Carolina, 
will likely generate publicity and concomitant litigation. However, 
lower-profile changes, such as redistricting plans in small school  
districts or changes from, say, single-member districts to at-large 
elections in little towns, could easily not generate attention.25  More-
over, even if they do generate some attention, there may not be suffi-
cient incentives to litigate against such changes either prior to im-
plementation or at all.26 
 Unfortunately, the section 5 process, to paraphrase pop-star Tay-
lor Swift, seems likely to “never, ever, ever, ever get back together.”27 
Proposals to revive some form of section 5 lie stalled in Congress.28 
And even if such proposals miraculously navigate the legislative 
shoals, the Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision leaves open the 
possibility of directly striking down section 5 in subsequent litigation.29 
 The preclearance process, though, was not the only unique aspect 
of section 5—section 5 also contained a special substantive standard 
for preventing discrimination. Section 5’s substantive standard was 
                                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 229 (“North Carolina imposed strict voter identification requirements, cut a 
week off of early voting, prohibited local election boards from keeping the polls open on the 
final Saturday afternoon before elections, eliminated same-day voter registration, opened 
up precincts to ‘challengers,’ eliminated pre-registration of sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds in high schools, and barred votes cast in the wrong precinct from being counted  
at all.”). 
 24. Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 77 (2014) (“There is no doubt that Shelby County’s removal of 
the preclearance bar precipitated enactment of this legislation. And North Carolina could 
be a harbinger of what is to come.”). For obvious reasons, it’s hard at this point to provide 
an example of a change that has slipped through the cracks. 
 25. Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samu-
el Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 
605, 612-17 (2005) (arguing that section 5’s greatest deterrent impact occurs at the  
local level). 
 26. See id. 
 27. TAYLOR SWIFT, WE ARE NEVER EVER GETTING BACK TOGETHER (Big Machine 
2012).  
 28. See Greg Sargent, Morning Plum: Why Congress Won’t Fix the Voting Rights Act 
Anytime Soon, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/wp/2015/03/09/morning-plum-why-congress-wont-fix-the-voting-rights-act-anytime-
soon/. 
 29. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (“We issue no holding 
on § 5 itself . . . .”); see also id. (“I would find § 5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional 
as well.”) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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two-pronged. On the one hand, section 5 prohibited voting changes 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose.30 The purpose standard, how-
ever, exists both in the Equal Protection Clause and in section 2  
of the Voting Rights Act, so it was not unique to section 5.31 On the 
other hand, section 5 prohibited voting changes adopted with a dis-
criminatory effect, with discriminatory effect defined as any change 
that would lead to a retrogression of minority voting strength.32 Thus, 
section 5 uniquely prevented the implementation of new voting laws 
that would leave minority voters worse off than if the status quo was 
retained.33 
 A couple of simple examples—one from the context of vote dilution 
(i.e., the ability to elect a sufficient number of preferred candidates of 
choice) and the other from the context of vote denial (i.e., the inability 
to participate in an election by casting a countable ballot)—
demonstrate how this worked. The first hypothetical involves vote 
dilution and redistricting. Assume the City of Mobile, Alabama, had 
seven single-member districts and three of those districts were con-
trolled by minority voters, thus allowing minority voters to elect their 
preferred candidates of choice.34 Then assume that the City adopted a 
redistricting plan reducing the number of single-member districts 
controlled by minority voters from three districts to two districts and 
sought preclearance for that new redistricting plan. In this simplified 
hypothetical, section 5 prevented the implementation of the newly 
adopted redistricting plan because it reduced by one the number of 
districts controlled by minority voters. 
 The second hypothetical involves vote denial and the moving of a 
polling place. Assume the City of Augusta, Georgia, had a precinct 
with a polling place in a government building located in the middle of 
a minority neighborhood. Assume that the City decided to move the 
polling place several miles away from the minority neighborhood to a 
white neighborhood, and that the new polling place would be a 
                                                                                                                                 
 30. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b)-(c) (Supp. II 2014). 
 31. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617-19 (1982) (describing discriminatory  
purpose under the Equal Protection Clause); see also Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 
763, 766 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Thus, after the 1982 amendment, the Voting Rights Act can  
be violated by both intentional discrimination in the drawing of district lines and facially 
neutral apportionment schemes that have the effect of diluting minority votes.”). 
 32. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (“[T]he  
purpose of [§] 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made 
that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”). 
 33. Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that  
“preclearance [must] be denied under the ‘effects’ prong of section 5 if a new system places 
minority voters in a weaker position than the existing system”). 
 34. Districts that allow minority voters to elect preferred candidates of choice are 
generally referred to as “safe,” “crossover,” or “coalition” districts. For definitions of these 
terms, see Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009). 
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church with an all-white congregation. In this simplified hypothet-
ical, section 5 prevented the polling place from moving out of the  
minority neighborhood because it would make it harder for minority 
voters to participate in an election. 
 The two losses of Shelby County recognized above on the proce-
dural and substantive level are similar to the losses recognized by 
the University of Chicago’s Nicholas Stephanopoulos. In an article 
devoted to, in essence, identifying what was lost when Shelby County 
neutered section 5, Professor Stephanopoulos identifies three key 
procedural differences between section 5 and the most prominent 
remaining bulwark against voting discrimination—section 2: 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff under Section 2 but on the 
jurisdiction under Section 5. The default is that a challenged policy 
goes into effect under Section 2 but that it does not under Section 
5. And the party that typically invokes the VRA’s protections is a 
private plaintiff under Section 2 but the DOJ under Section 5.35 
 In essence, the second and third aspects identified by Professor 
Stephanopoulos are the section 5 preclearance process itself. In that 
way, we are in agreement that much was lost from a process perspec-
tive. However, in my view, and how I differ from Professor Stepha-
nopoulos is on my focus of emphasis. Professor Stephanopoulos large-
ly analyzes the gap from the perspective of a change duly adopted 
being put through the preclearance process as opposed to affirmative 
litigation under section 2.36 In contrast, my main emphasis of what 
was lost procedurally would be on the deterrence value of section 5. 
Put differently, Professor Stephanopoulos’s article seems to focus on 
the gap between section 2 and section 5 after a change is actually 
adopted; 37 I think the primary procedural loss occurs because section 
5 prevented discriminatory changes from ever being adopted in the 
first place.38 
                                                                                                                                 
 35. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 57. I do not think the shifting of the burden of 
proof is all that significant of a difference between section 2 and section 5. The burden of 
proof should only come into play when the evidence is in equipoise, and that does not  
happen all that often. Indeed, Professor Stephanopoulos seems to imply that the burden of 
proof will not play a large role in many instances. Id. at 63 (“Sometimes the allocation of 
the burden is immaterial.”). 
 36. Id. at 118-26. 
 37. See id. at 66 (focusing on empirical evidence of “how many policies that were 
blocked by Section 5 would have gone into effect had only Section 2 been available to  
challenge them” while only briefly recognizing the deterrent effect of section 5). 
 38. To put the idea differently, if a change that arguably violates section 2 is never 
adopted in the first place, one does not have to worry at all about different burdens of 
proof, a discriminatory law going into temporary effect, or the need for private plaintiffs  
to litigate. 
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 On the substantive side, Professor Stephanopoulos distinguishes 
between the vote dilution and vote denial context. In the vote  
dilution context, he identifies the gap between section 2 and section 5 as: 
Section 2 does not extend to bizarrely shaped districts while Sec-
tion 5 does. Section 2 does not encompass districts that merge 
highly dissimilar minority communities while Section 5 again 
does. And Section 2 does not cover districts whose minority voters 
comprise less than 50 percent of their total population while Sec-
tion 5 does once more.39 
On the vote denial side, Professor Stephanopoulos notes: 
Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to demonstrate not only 
that a statistical disparity exists between minorities and whites, 
but also that a franchise restriction interacts with social and his-
torical conditions to cause the disparity. Under Section 5, on the 
other hand, a disparate impact alone usually suffices to prevent a 
restriction from going into effect, as long as the burden imposed by 
the restriction on voting is material.40 
 Again, Professor Stephanopoulos and I are in much agreement in 
relation to the substantive loss, but my emphasis would be different 
in the vote dilution context. I agree with Professor Stephanopoulos 
that section 2 would not prevent the backsliding of so-called “crosso-
ver” districts where minority voters comprise less than fifty percent 
of the district’s total population and also might substantially agree 
that section 2 does not cover districts that merge highly dissimilar 
minority communities (what Professor Stephanopoulos terms “heter-
ogeneous” districts).41 Yet my concern about the gap between section 
2 and section 5 does not lie solely with losing bizarrely shaped dis-
tricts, crossover districts, or heterogeneous districts. My main con-
cern is losing what one might call “run of the mill” districts that  
allow minority voters to elect preferred candidates of choice and that 
do not fall into any of these categories, and I will discuss this concern 
more in Part III.42 
 In short, procedural and substantive losses resulted from Shelby 
County. And it seems unlikely that the section 5 process will be re-
                                                                                                                                 
 39. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 58. 
 40. Id. at 60. 
 41. Id. at 74. I disagree with Professor Stephanopoulos that section 5 required the 
retention of “bizarrely shaped” districts. See id. The Department of Justice’s guidance  
on this matter explicitly stated that “preventing retrogression under Section 5 does not 
require jurisdictions to violate Shaw v. Reno and related cases.” Guidance Concerning  
Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 7470, 7472 (Feb. 9, 
2011). And it appears from Professor Stephanopoulos’s article that he equates “bizarrely 
shaped” districts with those that violate the Shaw line of cases. See Stephanopoulos, supra 
note 10, at 77-78 (noting the Shaw line of cases in discussing geographic compactness). 
 42. See infra notes 51-55. 
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suscitated. However, it seems slightly more possible that the sub-
stantive retrogression standard could be salvaged in some way, 
shape, or form. The next Part turns to an analysis of how that retro-
gression standard could be rescued and why it should be rescued. 
III.   RESCUING RETROGRESSION 
 The days of section 5’s procedural prowess seem finished, but the 
unique substantive standard of retrogression might still be saved. In 
this Part, I will lay out a substantive proposal for rescuing the retro-
gression standard. I will also explain why this proposal can comport 
with existing doctrine and why this proposal makes sense from a the-
oretical perspective. Finally, I will address potential pitfalls and 
downsides of this proposal. 
A.   The Presumption of a Section 2 Violation 
 The basic framework for rescuing retrogression is a simple one—
make the retrogression test from section 5 a part of the substantive 
standard of section 2. I would propose to do that by adding a gloss on 
the current framework for finding a violation of section 2—creating  
a strong presumption of a section 2 violation when a voting change 
retrogresses minority voting strength. 
 But before discussing the addition of retrogression into section 2, 
one must know how section 2’s results standard operates. To prove  
a violation of the section 2 results standard in the context of vote  
dilution claims (e.g., claims against at-large election systems or  
redistricting plans), plaintiffs must show the existence of the three 
so-called Gingles preconditions: (1) that the minority group is “suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in  
a single-member district”; (2) that minority citizens are “politically 
cohesive” (i.e., they vote as a cohesive bloc); and (3) that white voters 
cast ballots “sufficiently as a bloc to enable [them] . . . usually to  
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”43 If a plaintiff proves the 
existence of the Gingles preconditions, then the court considers the 
“totality of the circumstances,”44 which includes an examination of 
the so-called Senate Factors, such as a history of voting-related  
discrimination, and whether proportionality exists.45 
 The key, though, to section 2’s vote dilution framework is that it 
can compel a state or local government to create additional opportu-
nities for minority voters to elect preferred candidates of choice. For 
                                                                                                                                 
 43. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
 44. Id. at 36-37. 
 45. Id. at 36-37, 44-45; Pitts, Maintenance, supra note 7, at 920 n.111 (listing the 
“Senate factors”); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994) (noting the 
relevance of proportionality to the totality of circumstances). 
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instance, a successful section 2 lawsuit can force a county to switch 
from an at-large system where minority voters were unable to elect 
any preferred candidate of choice to a system of single-member dis-
tricts where minority voters are able to elect at least one preferred 
candidate of choice. A successful section 2 lawsuit can also compel a 
county that already has single-member districts to create one or  
more districts allowing minority voters to elect preferred candidates 
of choice. 
 The approach section 2 takes to election laws that might deny the 
ability to cast a countable ballot (such as the locations of polling plac-
es, the equipment used to vote, voter identification requirements) is, 
to put it mildly, not nearly as well defined.46 Suffice to say that no 
clear framework has emerged to answer important questions such as 
whether proof of vote dilution is necessary to a section 2 claim and 
whether there is a “voter fault” defense under section 2.47 Indeed, the 
greatest sticking point may be what more needs to be proved beyond 
disparate impact to find a violation of section 2 in the vote denial 
context. Several courts have asserted that a plaintiff bringing a sec-
tion 2 vote denial claim needs to prove something more than dispar-
ate impact, 48  but as Professor Stephanopoulos notes, “the lower 
courts disagree as to what this ‘something more’ actually is.”49 
 My proposal would preserve existing section 2 doctrine as it re-
lates to vote dilution and vote denial when challenging existing laws. 
I would, however, add an additional layer to the section 2 results 
                                                                                                                                 
 46.  Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42 n.24 (1st Cir. 2009); Janai S. Nelson, The 
Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 595 (2013) (“[T]he legal  
contours of vote denial claims remain woefully undeveloped . . . .”); Stephanopoulos, supra 
note 10, at 107 (“[I]t remains quite unclear how . . . [section 2] applies to vote denial.”); 
Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 
57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 709 (2006) (“While Gingles and its progeny have generated a well-
established standard for vote dilution, a satisfactory test for vote denial cases under Sec-
tion 2 has yet to emerge.”).  
 47. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconsti-
tutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (“[I]t ap-
pears that in the Eleventh Circuit a plaintiff must demonstrate something more than dis-
proportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.”); see also Frank v. Walker, 768 
F.3d 744, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Section 2(b) tells us that § 2(a) does not condemn a voting 
practice just because it has a disparate effect on minorities.”); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 
F.3d 383, 405 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] § 2 challenge ‘based purely on a showing of some rele-
vant statistical disparity between minorities and whites,’ without any evidence that the 
challenged voting qualification causes that disparity, will be rejected.” (quoting Smith v. 
Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595 (9th Cir. 1997))). 
 49. Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 108-09 (discussing lower court case law in this 
area). I tend to agree with Professor Stephanopoulos that in the vote denial context “there 
is substantive space between Section 2 and Section 5—but that it is not as extensive as it 
first might seem.” Id. at 116. 
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standard when dealing with a newly adopted law.50 In such a situa-
tion, if plaintiffs could demonstrate that the newly adopted law 
would have a retrogressive effect on minority voters, the newly 
adopted law would presumptively violate the section 2 results test. 
The burden would then shift to the defendant state or local govern-
ment to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the retro-
gression in order to avoid section 2 liability. 
 Consider a few hypothetical applications. Assume a city with  
a 33% citizen voting age Latino population has five single-member 
districts, two of which allow Latino voters to elect preferred candi-
dates of choice. On the heels of the most recent Census data, the city 
adopted a redistricting plan that only includes one district that  
allows Latino voters to elect a preferred candidate of choice. In this 
situation, the retrogression in the number of single-member districts 
that allow Latino voters to elect a candidate of choice would create a 
strong presumption of a section 2 violation and, absent unique cir-
cumstances (such as I will detail below), would end up being a section 
2 violation.51 
 Importantly, here is what rescuing retrogression helps preserve 
that the existing section 2 framework might very well not. In the  
hypothetical, it is not at all clear that even if the Gingles precondi-
tions existed and plaintiffs presented evidence of some—or even 
most—of the Senate factors, that a section 2 results violation would 
be found. A court might easily say that one out of five districts in the 
context of a 33% Latino citizen voting age population provides suffi-
cient representation for Latino voters and, therefore, does not 
amount to a section 2 violation.52 Indeed, perhaps the greatest prob-
lem with applying section 2 in the vote dilution context comes in this 
                                                                                                                                 
 50. The details of what constitutes “newly adopted” could be worked out on a case-by-
case basis. The paradigm is a situation where, say, a redistricting plan or new voter identi-
fication requirement is adopted by a state or local government and then challenged by  
minority plaintiffs relatively soon after adoption. I would not allow section 2 plaintiffs to sit 
on their rights for, say, a decade and then challenge a law as retrogressive. 
 51. One thing that should be considered is what the remedy for such a violation would 
be. In many instances, reinstatement of the prior existing law would likely be the appro-
priate remedy. For example, if a city attempts to switch from single-member districts to at-
large elections and that switch is found to be retrogressive and violate section 2, then the 
remedy would be reinstatement of the single-member districting method of election. How-
ever, in the context of redistricting, often the prior redistricting plan will violate one per-
son, one vote because of the publication of Census data demonstrating the existing districts 
are malapportioned. In such an instance, the remedy might be a court order to draw a new, 
non-retrogressive redistricting plan. 
 52. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008) (refusing to draw 
a second district (out of ten total districts) controlled by Latino voters when the Latino 
CVAP was 16.3%).  
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type of hypothetical where a single-member districting plan provides 
some representation but somewhat less representation than could be 
provided.53 
 While the reduction in the number of districts that allow Latino 
voters to elect a preferred candidate of choice would raise a presump-
tion of retrogression, that presumption could be overcome by the city. 
For instance, the city might be able to show that demographic trends 
make it impossible to draw a second district for Latino voters while 
still complying with the constitutional mandate of one person, one 
vote.54 Or, the city might be able to demonstrate that legally signifi-
cant racially polarized voting does not permeate city elections. In 
short, retrogression would not be an automatic violation.55 
 Let’s take another hypothetical example of how the presumption 
would operate, this time from the context of vote denial. Assume  
a county has a particular precinct that has a roughly even mix of  
African-American and white population. In the precinct, residential 
segregation exists such that the African-American population is  
almost exclusively on the south side of the precinct and the white 
population is almost exclusively on the north side. The precinct’s poll-
ing place is a public building located on the south side of the precinct, 
but the county decides to move the polling place to a private building 
on the north side of the precinct, and there is evidence that such a 
move will lead to a lower turnout among African-American voters at 
upcoming elections. In such an instance, the retrogression of African-
American voting strength would create a strong presumption of a 
section 2 violation. 
 Again, though, the presumption of a violation could be overcome. 
For instance, no violation would be found if the existing polling place 
                                                                                                                                 
 53. As previously intimated, I think this constitutes an important additional “gap”—
particularly at the local level—between section 2 and section 5 that was not sufficiently 
emphasized by Professor Stephanopoulos. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 54. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (articulating one person, one vote 
standard). 
 55. The idea that retrogression did not automatically violate section 5 was recognized 
by the Department of Justice in its review of redistricting plans: 
There may be circumstances in which the jurisdiction asserts that, because of 
shifts in population or other significant changes since the last redistricting 
(e.g., residential segregation and demographic distribution of the population 
within the jurisdiction, the physical geography of the jurisdiction, the jurisdic-
tion’s historical redistricting practices, political boundaries, such as cities or 
counties, and/or state redistricting requirements), retrogression is unavoidable. 
In those circumstances, the submitting jurisdiction seeking preclearance of 
such a plan bears the burden of demonstrating that a less-retrogressive plan 
cannot reasonably be drawn. 
Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
7470, 7472 (Feb. 9, 2011).  
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had burned down in a fire and no other location was available in the 
African-American portion of the precinct. Or, perhaps, the polling 
place had to be moved to accommodate disabled voters, and no other 
location accessible to disabled voters existed in the African-American 
portion of the precinct. As with vote dilution, the presumption of a 
Section 2 violation could be overcome by the defendant in the vote 
denial context as well. 
 To sum up, my proposal would be to have two “tracks” to proving a 
violation of the section 2 results standard.56 The first track would be 
the traditional analysis that has been performed for vote dilution 
(i.e., proof of the Gingles preconditions and then an analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances) and vote denial cases for some time. 
The second track—what might be called the “retrogression track”—
would be proof of retrogression that creates a strong, though rebutta-
ble, presumption of a section 2 violation. In this way, the section 5 
retrogression standard could be rescued. 
B.   Why Rescue Retrogression? 
 My proposal “rescues” retrogression, but why would we want to do 
that? The primary reason to rescue retrogression is to retain the 
gains made by minority voters that have occurred since initial  
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Moreover, my proposal to 
rescue retrogression is doctrinally workable and relatively realistic. 
That said, rescuing retrogression inevitably involves trade-offs and 
potential downsides, which will also be explored. 
 The primary reason for rescuing retrogression is that the gains 
made by the Voting Rights Act since its adoption in 1965 must be 
preserved. In 2008, I wrote an article in the Alabama Law Review 
positing that the Voting Rights Act had entered an “Era of Mainte-
nance” and that the primary goal of the Voting Rights Act going  
forward should be to maintain the gains made by minority voters.57 
                                                                                                                                 
 56. It should be noted that Professor Stephanopoulos has advocated for changes to  
the substantive side of section 2 in the vote dilution context that would apply section 2 
coverage to “districts that are strangely shaped or whose minority populations are hetero-
geneous or below 50 percent in size.” Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 61. In the vote 
denial context, he proposed to “make disparate impact alone the standard for Section 2 
liability.” Id. He avers that this would generally create “Section 2 liability . . . in the exact 
circumstances in which there is retrogression under Section 5.” Id. at 123. However,  
because Professor Stephanopoulos’s focus was on identifying the gap between section 2 and 
section 5, both theoretically and empirically, he did not elaborate very much on these  
proposals. Indeed, he spent much more time discussing other ideas, such as a revised cov-
erage formula or enhanced section 3 coverage, to fix the gap between section 2 and section 
5. Id. at 119-22. Thus, while it might seem that Professor Stephanopoulos would agree that 
the retrogression test should be rescued—particularly in the context of vote dilution—it’s 
not clear that he would create the same system that I would. 
 57. See generally Pitts, Maintenance, supra note 7, at 906. 
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As I wrote: 
Maintenance . . . may well represent the proper approach  
because it serves to best balance the competing realities and theo-
ries of the democratic process. No one theory can explain or set the 
entire agenda for American democracy . . . maintenance, with its 
allowance for traditional vote dilution litigation, recognizes the 
need to break up entrenched political interests that completely (or  
nearly completely) stifle political accountability to minority  
voters . . . [and] maintenance recognizes that the ability to compete 
in the legislature for preferred policy preferences . . . requires that 
the “toe-hold” that minority groups have in terms of descriptive 
representation be retained.58 
 Without question, minority voters are a lot better off in 2015 than 
they were in 1965. The ability of minority voters to participate—to 
register and cast a countable ballot—has drastically improved. 59 
Moreover, many more minority candidates are elected to federal, 
state, and local offices in 2015 than were elected in 1965.60 
 Despite these substantial gains, one would not say that we’ve  
arrived at perfect equality. In terms of participation, Latino and 
Asian-American registration and turnout rates are significantly  
lower than those of whites and African Americans.61 When consider-
ing descriptive representation, it is certainly true that the number of 
minority officials has increased substantially. However, minority 
groups remain “underrepresented at almost every level of govern-
ment.”62 Indeed, the underrepresentation of minority groups remains 
most pronounced at the state and local level of government—the 
place where section 5 may have had its greatest impact.63 At the state 
                                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 908. 
 59. KHALILAH BROWN-DEAN ET AL., JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, 
50 YEARS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 8 (2015), http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
VRA%20report%2C%203.5.15%20%281130%20am%29%28updated%29.pdf (“[S]ince the 
Voting Rights Act’s 1965 passage, African Americans residing in former Confederate states 
have gone from near total disenfranchisement to registration and turnout rates that equal 
or surpass those of whites in the same states, at least in presidential general election  
contests.”). 
 60.  Juliet Eilperin, What’s Changed for African Americans Since 1963, by the Num-
bers, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/ 
08/22/whats-changed-for-african-americans-since-1963-by-the-numbers/ (“The number of 
African-American elected officials has also risen dramatically since researchers started 
tracking it in 1970. Forty-three years ago there were 1,469 black elected officials nation-
wide . . . in 2011 there were roughly 10,500 such officials.”); BROWN-DEAN, supra note 59, 
at 24-29 (“Since 1965, African Americans went from holding fewer than 1,000 elected offic-
es to over 10,000, Latinos from a small number to over 6,000, and Asian Americans from  
under a hundred to almost a thousand.”). 
 61. BROWN-DEAN, supra note 59, at 8 (“Latino and Asian American registration and 
turnout rates, however, continue to trail [whites and African Americans] significantly.”). 
 62. Id. at 29. 
 63. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
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level, whites account for 85% of all the seats even though whites are 
only 75% of all voters and 62% of the total population.64 At the local 
level, “whites still hold well over 90% of all local offices.”65 
 Because some minority groups do not yet participate to the same 
extent as whites and because all minority groups have substantially 
less than proportional representation, it is enormously important that 
we maintain the gains that have been made thus far.  I do not think 
the Shelby County decision means we are inevitably headed toward 
another era of massive, blatant disfranchisement and voting-related 
discrimination, such as occurred during the late 1800s.66 Yet it is  
important to remember the disfranchisement of the late 1800s did 
not happen overnight—it happened gradually over a period of about 
a quarter century.67 In light of that history, and current facts, pre-
venting retrogression of minority voting strength should be at the 
forefront of Voting Rights Act enforcement, and rescuing retrogres-
sion helps quite a bit to achieve that end.68 
 Rescuing retrogression also makes sense from a doctrinal perspec-
tive. I take, as a given, that UC-Davis’s Chris Elmendorf is correct 
when he notes that section 2 essentially amounts to “a delegation  
of authority [by Congress] to the courts to develop a common law of 
racially fair elections.”69 And that “Section 2 precedents should not 
enjoy the super-strong stare decisis typical of statutory precedents, 
but rather the weak stare decisis of precedents under the Sherman 
Act, the paradigmatic common law statute.”70 Because of these in-
sights, flexibility exists to employ the common law of section 2 as a 
“vehicle for innovation and change.”71 
 The “famously elliptical”72 language of section 2 provides a hook in 
the statutory text for rescuing retrogression through common law 
interpretation. Section 2’s plain language interprets “results” as a 
“totality of the circumstances” standard.73 The above language also 
interprets results in the opaque language of “less opportunity . . . to 
                                                                                                                                 
 64. BROWN-DEAN, supra note 59, at 32. 
 65. Id. at 33. 
 66. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT 1, 121-22 (2004). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Because maintenance of existing minority voting strength is the primary goal, I 
would not allow minority heterogeneity of a district to serve as a justification for retrogres-
sion. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 10, at 78-80 (discussing minority heterogeneity). 
 69. Elmendorf, supra note 47, at 404. 
 70. Id. at 384. 
 71. Max Huffman & Mark Anderson, Devils, Scripture, and Antitrust 6 (Mar. 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 72. Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 73. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
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participate in the political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice.”74 Section 2’s language also allows the “extent to which 
members of [a minority group] have been elected to office” as a factor 
to be considered in the totality of circumstances analysis.75 Finally, 
section 2 does not create a “right” to proportional representation.76 
 A full excursus into a statutory analysis of section 2 lies beyond 
the scope of this modest Article. But, at first blush, a totality of the 
circumstances analysis creates room for retrogression to serve as a 
presumption of a section 2 violation.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in 
the early 1990s, added a new factor to the section 2 totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis, so precedent exists to support modifying the 
analysis.78 Moreover, retrogression of minority voting strength would 
also seem to create, absent other compelling factors, “less opportuni-
ty” for minority group members “to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.”79  Finally, to the extent 
                                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. § 10301(b). 
 75. Id. 
 76. The full text of section 2 reads as follows: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in 
a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in 
subsection (b). 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circum-
stances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or 
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to partici-
pation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to 
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their 
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected 
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may 
be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to 
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their propor-
tion in the population. 
Id. § 10301. 
 77. Cf. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 241 (4th Cir. 
2014) (“First, the district court bluntly held that ‘Section 2 does not incorporate a “retro-
gression” standard’ . . . . Contrary to the district court’s statements, Section 2, on its face, 
requires a broad ‘totality of the circumstances review.’ Clearly, an eye toward past practic-
es is part and parcel of the totality of the circumstances.” (first quoting N.C. State Confer-
ence of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 351 (2014); then quoting 52 
U.S.C. § 10301(b))). 
 78. See generally Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (adding proportionality 
as a consideration in the section 2 analysis). 
 79. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added); cf. Ohio State Conference of the 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 558 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[U]nder the Section 2 analysis, 
the focus is whether minorities enjoy less opportunity to vote as compared to other voters. 
The fact that a practice or law eliminates voting opportunities that used to exist under 
prior law that African Americans disproportionately used is therefore relevant to an  
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the retrogression presumption applies to vote dilution claims, it con-
siders the extent to which minority group members achieve electoral 
success and does not create a right to proportional representation 
because all it does is preserve existing gains rather than compel ad-
ditional efforts to achieve proportional representation.80 
 One could also find additional, though non-definitive, support for 
retrogression creating a presumption of a section 2 violation in one of 
the most recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting section 2. In 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), a key to 
the Court’s holding that Texas’ congressional redistricting plan vio-
lated section 2 was the fact that the State “took away the Latinos’ 
[ability to elect a candidate of choice] because Latinos were about to 
exercise it.”81 Indeed, the Court mentioned that this change “under-
mined the progress of a racial group that has been subject to signifi-
cant voting-related discrimination.”82  In essence, one might easily 
recast the LULAC decision as one that fits with the general proposi-
tion that the section 2 results standard should generally prohibit the 
adoption of retrogressive voting laws. 
 In addition to theoretical and doctrinal reasons for rescuing retro-
gression, a practical reason also exists. Using retrogression as a  
presumption for a violation of the results test provides a relatively 
administrable standard. The retrogression test was implemented for 
several decades, and little evidence demonstrates that the test was 
difficult to administer. The Court, in the arena of election law, tends 
to prefer relatively simple tests to more complex inquiries with  
perhaps the paradigm of doctrinal administrability being the “sixth-
grade arithmetic” of one person, one vote.83 In essence, retrogression 
as a presumption of a section 2 violation amounts to a judicially 
manageable standard. 
                                                                                                                                 
assessment of whether, under the current system, African Americans have an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in the political process as compared to other voters.”), vacated, No. 14-
3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014). 
 80. Perhaps the biggest doctrinal road-block to my proposal is a single sentence from a 
footnote in the Senate Report that accompanied the 1982 Amendment to section 2: “Plain-
tiffs could not establish a Section 2 violation merely by showing that a challenged reappor-
tionment or annexation, for example, involved a retrogressive effect on the political 
strength of a minority group.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 68 n.224 (1982). Of course, legislative 
history can easily be pushed to the side by using a plain-language interpretation. But,  
beyond that, because my proposal only involves retrogression creating a strong presump-
tion of a section 2 violation, it is possible to argue that such a claim involves more than just 
demonstrating retrogression—it involves demonstrating that the retrogression has not 
been justified by the defendant. 
 81. 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 439. 
 83. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,  
dissenting); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 1051, 1099-1103 (2010) (discussing “manageability” as a theme of Voting 
Rights Act doctrine). 
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 At the end of the day, the main reason to adopt my proposal—the 
need to maintain the gains made by minority voters since passage of 
the Voting Rights Act in the covered jurisdictions where many minor-
ity citizens reside—is both practical and theoretical. The doctrinal 
justifications merely show my proposal to be a plausible interpreta-
tion of section 2.84 Moreover, I think this proposal has more potential 
to be adopted because all it would take to be implemented is a change 
of one member of the Supreme Court rather than congressional action.85 
C.   Concerns About Rescuing Retrogression 
 Of course, any doctrinal test inevitably involves trade-offs. There 
are potential downsides to importing the section 5 retrogression test 
into the section 2 results standard. The primary downside on the vote 
dilution front would seem to be that section 5’s retrogression stand-
ard emphasizes descriptive over substantive representation and may 
not do much to move toward a day when the Voting Rights Act be-
comes unnecessary. The primary downside on the vote denial front 
would seem to be that the retrogression test might inhibit experi-
mentation by state and local governments because they would be 
concerned about getting “stuck” with progressive changes. In addi-
tion, a few other less pressing problems merit discussion. 
 When it comes to vote dilution, rescuing retrogression will mean 
that, absent special circumstances, state and local governments will 
need to preserve districts that allow minority voters to elect their 
preferred candidates of choice. These types of districts almost invari-
ably lead to minority voters achieving “descriptive representation”—
the ability to elect candidates of the same minority group as the  
minority voters who control outcomes in the single-member district.86 
The elevation of descriptive representation to such an inviolate level 
could lead to a reduction in substantive representation—the ability of 
minority voters to get their preferred policies implemented by legisla-
tive bodies.87 
                                                                                                                                 
 84. I leave to one side issues as to whether importing retrogression into section 2 
would violate the United States Constitution. Presumably, a Supreme Court willing to 
rescue retrogression will find a way to avoid holding that such an approach violates the 
Constitution. Regardless, there is recent evidence that civil rights remedies heavily reliant 
on disparate impact analysis will pass constitutional muster. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (upholding use of 
disparate impact standard in the Fair Housing Act). 
 85. I’m far less certain a change in membership of the Supreme Court would result in 
the overruling of Shelby County. It’s quite possible that ship has sailed. 
 86. Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science 
and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1569 (2002) (discussing descriptive 
representation). 
 87. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481 (2003) (defining substantive representation). 
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 But there may be reasons to prefer descriptive representation  
over substantive representation. First, descriptive representation is 
something courts can workably define, whereas other measures of 
political power seem harder to pin down.88 Second, descriptive repre-
sentation sends an important symbolic message that may lead to 
greater participation.89 Third, descriptive representation, while not 
perfect, may well lead to substantive representation, particularly  
at the local level.90 Fourth, it’s not obvious to me that a clear path 
exists to achieve substantive representation. Put differently, even if 
substantive representation is the goal, will lessening the amount of 
descriptive representation actually cause better political outcomes for 
minority voters?91 Finally, rescuing retrogression would help preserve 
one type of district that seems more favorable to substantive repre-
sentation—the “crossover” district.92 
 Another problem with rescuing retrogression is that it may create 
outcomes that seem unfair when comparing the electoral practices  
of different jurisdictions, particularly in the vote denial context. For 
instance, one state may have same-day voter registration and anoth-
er state may have a thirty-day advance registration requirement. 
Perhaps the state with same-day voter registration would like to  
implement a ten-day advance voter registration requirement, but  
doing so would retrogress minority voting strength. In this situation, 
rescuing retrogression would lead to one state not being able to make 
a change that might still be more liberal than another state, leading 
to what some might view as unfair treatment. 
 But section 2 and, indeed, election law itself has never been inter-
preted to require the exact same outcomes for different jurisdictions. 
For instance, in some places at-large elections violate section 2, but 
                                                                                                                                 
 88. Cf. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1527, 
1540 (2015) (noting that judges could have difficulty assessing group political influence). 
 89. Jennifer L. Merolla et al., Descriptive Representation, Political Efficacy, and  
African Americans in the 2008 Presidential Election, 34 POL. PSYCHOL. 863, 873 (2013) 
(“The evidence is fairly strong that having descriptive representat[ion] increases political 
participation.”). 
 90. Kenneth J. Meier et al., Structural Choices and Representational Biases: The Post-
Election Color of Representation, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758, 759 (2005) (“[S]tudies at the local 
level present evidence that descriptive representation is indeed associated with substantive 
policy representation.”); Robert R. Preuhs, The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive 
Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States, 68 J. POL. 
585, 597-98 (2006) (concluding that in state legislatures “descriptive representation has 
real implications for substantive representation and policy influence”).  
 91. Cf. Pitts, Maintenance, supra note 7, at 979 (questioning whether it is practical to 
trade off descriptive representation for substantive representation in most redistricting 
contexts, most notably at the local level).  
 92. See supra text accompanying note 41 (noting that “crossover” districts are part of 
the “gap” between section 2 and section 5). 
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in other places, at-large elections do not.93 As one court recently not-
ed: “The focus [of Section 2] is on the internal processes of a single 
State or political subdivision and the opportunities enjoyed by that 
particular electorate. The text of section 2 does not direct courts to 
compare opportunities across States.”94 Indeed, other areas of election 
law work the same. In some instances, drawing a district allowing 
minority voters to elect a preferred candidate of choice will constitute 
racial gerrymandering; in other instances it will not.95 In some in-
stances, an overall range of relative deviation of 0.6984 violates one 
person, one vote doctrine, in other instances, a higher overall range 
of relative deviation of 0.79 does not.96 A section 2 violation is always 
contingent upon particular facts and circumstances and has never 
mandated a “one-size fits all” approach—section 2 demands an “in-
tensely local appraisal.”97 
 The real problem when it comes to different treatment among the 
states is that rescuing retrogression might provide a disincentive to 
the adoption of electoral changes favorable to minority voters. For 
instance, a state might consider adopting, say, same-day voter regis-
tration but decide not to do so because this will create a new baseline 
for minority participation that the state will be stuck with forever. In 
this way, a section 2 that rescues retrogression might stifle electoral 
innovation. 
 Admittedly, this is a possibility, but probably not a large problem. 
It seems to me that the barrier to the adoption of changes that would 
be disproportionately positive for minority voters is not fear of being 
stuck with the change in perpetuity but not wanting minority voters 
to cast more ballots in large part because of their political leanings 
toward the Democratic Party.98 Put differently, if a jurisdiction wants 
to adopt a change favorable to minority voters, I do not think the 
new, more favorable voting rights baseline it creates is likely to be a 
                                                                                                                                 
 93. Gerald Benjamin, At-Large Elections in N.Y.S. Cities, Towns, Villages, and School 
Districts and the Challenge of Growing Population Diversity, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 733, 747-
48 (2012) (describing successful and unsuccessful section 2 challenges to the use of at-large 
elections in New York counties). The same point goes for vote dilution litigation under the 
Constitution. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (declining to invalidate 
multi-member districts in Indiana), with White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (declaring 
invalid multi-member districts in Texas). 
 94. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 559 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 95. Compare Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (finding that racial gerrymander-
ing occurred in Georgia), with Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (finding that no 
racial gerrymandering occurred in North Carolina). 
 96. Compare Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983) (rejecting New Jersey’s 
congressional districting plan), with Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n., 133 S. Ct. 3, 6 
(2012) (upholding West Virginia’s congressional districting plan). 
 97. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986). 
 98. I leave aside the incredibly thorny question of whether race or politics is the  
primary motivation in such an instance. 
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major barrier.99 Moreover, jurisdictions could avoid being stuck with 
changes in perpetuity by either adopting changes as short-term pilot 
programs or with sunset provisions that would not create a new 
benchmark for minority voting strength forever. Indeed, it is quite 
possible that the only “innovation” that will be stifled is the type of in-
novation adopted by North Carolina after the Shelby County decision.100 
 There are also scenarios that would seem to be outliers that might 
pose thorny problems. For instance, it is possible a voting change 
would be beneficial to Latino voters at the expense of African-
American voters. In such an instance, the presumption of a violation 
might be overcome by the jurisdiction if there is a demonstrated ben-
efit to another minority group. Another likely outlier situation would 
be where a change is retrogressive for minority voters but would lead 
to greater participation by the electorate as a whole. Again, though, 
in this instance, a jurisdiction might be able to overcome the pre-
sumption of a violation through such a showing. And another outlier 
situation might occur when a minority group has much greater than 
proportional representation. But, again, a jurisdiction might be able 
to overcome the presumption of a violation. 
 Tough and unique cases may present themselves, but my overall 
point is that in the run of situations, it would be better to rescue ret-
rogression and to worry less about unique circumstances. We should 
do what we can to preserve the significant gains made by minority 
voters since 1965, and the potential downsides of rescuing retrogres-
sion do not outweigh the need to maintain these gains. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The section 5 process seems unlikely to re-emerge on the voting 
rights landscape. However, section 5’s substantive retrogression test 
should be rescued and imported into the section 2 results standard. 
This should occur because an overarching goal of the Voting Rights 
Act should be to maintain the gains fostered by the Act since 1965. 
 Admittedly, the proposal included in this Article is a modest  
one, and one that will not cure all that ails American democracy from  
the standpoint of minority voting rights. And even such a modest 
proposal seems unlikely, absent a change in membership of the  
Supreme Court, to be adopted. But in picking up the pieces of Shelby 
County, one has to start somewhere—and that start should be rescu-
ing retrogression. 
                                                                                                                                 
 99. Of course, I admit on the margins this could make a difference. For instance, if 
passage of a new election law by the legislature is a close call, it is possible a key vote could 
be lost for this reason. 
 100. See supra notes 19-23. 
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